draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-02.txt		draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-03.txt
	GROW D. McPherson		GROW D. McPherson
	Internet-Draft Verisign, Inc.		Internet-Draft Verisign, Inc.
	Intended status: Informational S. Amante		Intended status: Informational S. Amante
	Expires: February 2, 2014 Level 3 Communications, Inc.		Expires: May 22, 2014 Level 3 Communications, Inc.
	E. Osterweil		E. Osterweil
	Verisign, Inc.		Verisign, Inc.
	D. Mitchell		D. Mitchell
	Twitter, Inc.		Twitter, Inc.
	August 1, 2013		November 18, 2013
	Route-Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC		Route-Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC
	draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-02		draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-03
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates		This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates
	how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily		how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily
	circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via		circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via
	BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Global Routing		BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Global Routing
	Operations Working group (GROW) during routing security requirements		Operations Working group (GROW) during routing security requirements
	discussions and subsequent specification.		discussions and subsequent specification.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 40		skipping to change at page 1, line 40
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on February 2, 2014.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2014.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 5, line 50		skipping to change at page 5, line 50
	An operator would expect that such an attribute would accurately		An operator would expect that such an attribute would accurately
	reflect the attacker's ASN in the appropriate location of the		reflect the attacker's ASN in the appropriate location of the
	BGPSEC_Path. Unfortunately, as currently designed,		BGPSEC_Path. Unfortunately, as currently designed,
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] is unable to distinguish whether an		[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] is unable to distinguish whether an
	ASN is allowed, by policy, to add their ASN within the BGPSEC_Path		ASN is allowed, by policy, to add their ASN within the BGPSEC_Path
	attribute before the BGP update is propagated to downstream ASNs.		attribute before the BGP update is propagated to downstream ASNs.
	This proves that mechanisms defined in		This proves that mechanisms defined in
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] would not stop an attacker from		[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] would not stop an attacker from
	completing this type of attack.		completing this type of attack.
			It should be noted that the attack scenario described in this
			document can be mitigated by performing proper route filtering
			techniques.
	Discussion of out of band methods to mitigate this attack are		Discussion of out of band methods to mitigate this attack are
	important; albeit beyond the scope of this document. This document		important; albeit beyond the scope of this document. This document
	is meant to provide input into routing protocol design choices being		is meant to provide input into routing protocol design choices being
	considered within the IETF, and to foster discussion of the practical		considered within the IETF, and to foster discussion of the practical
	implications of "policy" and "intent" in operational routing system		implications of "policy" and "intent" in operational routing system
	security.		security.
	3. Acknowledgements		3. Acknowledgements
			The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of John Curran.
	4. IANA Considerations		4. IANA Considerations
	There are no actions for IANA in the document.		There are no actions for IANA in the document.
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	This document describes an attack on an RPKI-enabled BGPSEC and is		This document describes an attack on an RPKI-enabled BGPSEC and is
	meant to inform the IETF community that this vulnerability exists as		meant to inform the IETF community that this vulnerability exists as
	a result of route-leaks and attacks that conform to this type of		a result of route-leaks and attacks that conform to this type of
	behavior, and that operators should not assume that that work items		behavior, and that operators should not assume that that work items
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