draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-03.txt		draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04.txt
	Global Routing Operations J. Mauch		Global Routing Operations J. Mauch
	Internet-Draft J. Snijders		Internet-Draft Akamai
	Intended status: Standards Track NTT		Intended status: Standards Track J. Snijders
	Expires: August 25, 2017 G. Hankins		Expires: September 28, 2017 NTT
			G. Hankins
	Nokia		Nokia
	February 21, 2017		March 27, 2017
	Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies		Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
	draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-03		draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when		This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
	there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP		there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP
	session.		session.
	Requirements Language		Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	skipping to change at page 1, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 41 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2017.		This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2017.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 27 ¶
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be		There are BGP routing security issues that need to be addressed to
	revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a		make the Internet more stable. Route leaks [RFC7908] are part of the
	need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default		problem, but software defects or operator misconfigurations can
	behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem. Routing leaks		contribute too. This document provides guidance to BGP [RFC4271]
	[RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator		implementers to improve the default level of Internet routing
	misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability		security.
	we aim to address.
	Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route		Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route
	announcements between their BGP neighbors by default. This practice		announcements between their BGP neighbors by default. This practice
	dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were		dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were
	permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to		permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to
	reach each other. As the Internet has become more densely		reach each other. As the Internet has become more densely
	interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses		interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
	significant risks to Internet routing.		significant risks to Internet routing.
	This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the		This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
	explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any		explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any
	External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or		External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
	confederation boundaries in a base router or VPN instances. When		confederation boundaries for all enabled address families. When this
	this solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send		solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes
	routes without policies configured on EBGP sessions.		without policies configured on EBGP sessions.
	2. Solution Requirements		2. Solution Requirements
	The following requirements apply to the solution described in this		The following requirements apply to the solution described in this
	document:		document:
	o Software MUST consider any routes ineligible for route selection		o Software MUST consider any routes ineligible for route selection
	(section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured for		(section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured for
	the EBGP peer.		the EBGP peer.
	skipping to change at page 3, line 31 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 31 ¶
	o Software MUST operate in this mode by default.		o Software MUST operate in this mode by default.
	o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this		o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
	security capability.		security capability.
	3. Acknowledgments		3. Acknowledgments
	The authors would like to thank the following people for their		The authors would like to thank the following people for their
	comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,		comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
	Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi,		Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi,
	Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, and John Heasley.		Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, John Heasley, Ignas Bagdonas and Donald
			Smith.
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	This document addresses a basic routing security flaw caused by		This document addresses a basic routing security issue caused by
	permissive default routing policy configurations. Operators need		permissive default routing policy configurations. Operators need
	implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to		implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to
	mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing. Inadvertent or		mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing. Inadvertent or
	adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be		adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be
	mitigated by a secure default behavior.		mitigated by a secure default behavior.
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	This document has no actions for IANA.		This document has no actions for IANA.
	skipping to change at page 4, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 39 ¶
	7.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
	[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,		[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
	and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of		and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
	BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June		BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
	2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.		2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Jared Mauch		Jared Mauch
	NTT Communications		Akamai Technologies
	8285 Reese Lane		8285 Reese Lane
	Ann Arbor Michigan 48103		Ann Arbor Michigan 48103
	US		US
	Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net		Email: jared@akamai.com
	Job Snijders		Job Snijders
	NTT Communications		NTT Communications
	Theodorus Majofskistraat 100		Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
	Amsterdam 1065 SZ		Amsterdam 1065 SZ
	NL		NL
	Email: job@ntt.net		Email: job@ntt.net
	Greg Hankins		Greg Hankins
	Nokia		Nokia
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