Global Routing Operations                                       J. Mauch
Internet-Draft                                               J. Snijders
Intended status: Standards Track                                     NTT
Expires: May 4, August 25, 2017                                      G. Hankins
                                                                   Nokia
                                                        October 31, 2016
                                                       February 21, 2017

        Default IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
                     draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02
                     draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-03

Abstract

   This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
   there is no import or export policy associated with a an External BGP session for
   the IPv4 or IPv6 Unicast Address Family.
   session.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, August 25, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Introduction

   BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be
   revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem.  There is a
   need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default
   behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem.  Routing leaks
   [RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator
   misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability
   we aim to address.

   Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all routes from a peer route
   announcements between their BGP neighbors by default.  This practice
   dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were
   permissive in offering sending routing information to allow all networks to
   reach each other.  As the Internet has become more densely
   interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
   significant risks to Internet routing.

   This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
   explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any EBGP
   speaking
   External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
   confederation boundaries in a base router or VPN instances.  When
   this solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send
   routes without policies configured on EBGP sessions.

2.  Solution Requirements

   The following requirements for the IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast Address
   Family apply to the solution described in this
   document:

   o  Software MUST consider any routes from an EBGP peer invalid, ineligible for route selection
      (section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured. configured for
      the EBGP peer.

   o  Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no
      export policy was configured.

   o  Software SHOULD provide protection from internal failures
      preventing the advertisement fall back to an "import nothing" and acceptance "export
      nothing" mode following failure of routes. internal components, such as a
      policy engine.

   o  Software MUST operate in this mode by default.

   o  Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
      security capability.

3.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their
   comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
   Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, and
   Brian Dickson. Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, and John Heasley.

4.  Security Considerations

   This document addresses the a basic routing security behavior of how a BGP
   speaker propagates routes in a flaw caused by
   permissive default configuration without
   policies. routing policy configurations.  Operators have a need for
   implementers to address the this problem through a behavior change with more secure defaults to
   mitigate against possible
   attacks from a permissive security behavior.  Attacks and inadvertent collateral damage on Internet routing.  Inadvertent or
   adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be
   mitigated by a secure default behavior.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

6.  Contributors

   The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution
   described in this document:

   Jakob Heitz
   Cisco

   Email: jheitz@cisco.com

   Ondrej Filip
   CZ.NIC

   Email: ondrej.filip@nic.cz

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC7908]  Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
              and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
              BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
              2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.

Authors' Addresses

   Jared Mauch
   NTT Communications
   8285 Reese Lane
   Ann Arbor  Michigan 48103
   US

   Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net
   Job Snijders
   NTT Communications
   Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
   Amsterdam  1065 SZ
   NL

   Email: job@ntt.net

   Greg Hankins
   Nokia
   777 E. Middlefield Road
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   USA

   Email: greg.hankins@nokia.com