draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02.txt		draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-03.txt
	Global Routing Operations J. Mauch		Global Routing Operations J. Mauch
	Internet-Draft J. Snijders		Internet-Draft J. Snijders
	Intended status: Standards Track NTT		Intended status: Standards Track NTT
	Expires: May 4, 2017 G. Hankins		Expires: August 25, 2017 G. Hankins
	Nokia		Nokia
	October 31, 2016		February 21, 2017
	Default IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without		Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
	Policies		draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-03
	draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when		This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
	there is no import or export policy associated with a BGP session for		there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP
	the IPv4 or IPv6 Unicast Address Family.		session.
	Requirements Language		Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	skipping to change at page 1, line 41 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 40 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.		This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2017.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	skipping to change at page 2, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 34 ¶
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be		BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be
	revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a		revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a
	need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default		need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default
	behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem. Routing leaks		behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem. Routing leaks
	[RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator		[RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator
	misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability		misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability
	we aim to address.		we aim to address.
	Many BGP speakers send and accept all routes from a peer by default.		Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route
	This practice dates back to the early days of the Internet, where		announcements between their BGP neighbors by default. This practice
	operators were permissive in offering routing information to allow		dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were
	all networks to reach each other. As the Internet has become more		permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to
	densely interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses		reach each other. As the Internet has become more densely
			interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
	significant risks to Internet routing.		significant risks to Internet routing.
	This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the		This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
	explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any EBGP		explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any
	speaking session such as customers, peers, or confederation		External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
	boundaries in a base router or VPN instances. When this solution is		confederation boundaries in a base router or VPN instances. When
	implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes without		this solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send
	policies configured on EBGP sessions.		routes without policies configured on EBGP sessions.
	2. Solution Requirements		2. Solution Requirements
	The following requirements for the IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast Address		The following requirements apply to the solution described in this
	Family apply to the solution described in this document:		document:
	o Software MUST consider any routes from an EBGP peer invalid, if no		o Software MUST consider any routes ineligible for route selection
	import policy was configured.		(section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured for
			the EBGP peer.
	o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no		o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no
	export policy was configured.		export policy was configured.
	o Software SHOULD provide protection from internal failures		o Software SHOULD fall back to an "import nothing" and "export
	preventing the advertisement and acceptance of routes.		nothing" mode following failure of internal components, such as a
			policy engine.
	o Software MUST operate in this mode by default.		o Software MUST operate in this mode by default.
	o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this		o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
	security capability.		security capability.
	3. Acknowledgments		3. Acknowledgments
	The authors would like to thank the following people for their		The authors would like to thank the following people for their
	comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,		comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
	Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, and		Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi,
	Brian Dickson.		Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, and John Heasley.
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	This document addresses the basic security behavior of how a BGP		This document addresses a basic routing security flaw caused by
	speaker propagates routes in a default configuration without		permissive default routing policy configurations. Operators need
	policies. Operators have a need for implementers to address the		implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to
	problem through a behavior change to mitigate against possible		mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing. Inadvertent or
	attacks from a permissive security behavior. Attacks and inadvertent		adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be
	advertisements cause business impact that can be mitigated by a		mitigated by a secure default behavior.
	secure default behavior.
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	This document has no actions for IANA.		This document has no actions for IANA.
	6. Contributors		6. Contributors
	The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution		The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution
	described in this document:		described in this document:
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