draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy-05.txt   draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy-06.txt 
Network Working Group A. Cooper Network Working Group A. Cooper
Internet-Draft Cisco Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Informational F. Gont Intended status: Informational F. Gont
Expires: October 29, 2015 Huawei Technologies Expires: December 27, 2015 Huawei Technologies
D. Thaler D. Thaler
Microsoft Microsoft
April 27, 2015 June 25, 2015
Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms
draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy-05.txt draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy-06.txt
Abstract Abstract
This document discusses privacy and security considerations for This document discusses privacy and security considerations for
several IPv6 address generation mechanisms, both standardized and several IPv6 address generation mechanisms, both standardized and
non-standardized. It evaluates how different mechanisms mitigate non-standardized. It evaluates how different mechanisms mitigate
different threats and the trade-offs that implementors, developers, different threats and the trade-offs that implementors, developers,
and users face in choosing different addresses or address generation and users face in choosing different addresses or address generation
mechanisms. mechanisms.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 29, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 27, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 3, line 20 skipping to change at page 3, line 20
* IPv4 address * IPv4 address
* Service port * Service port
* Wordy * Wordy
* Low-byte * Low-byte
o Stateless Address Auto-Cofiguration (SLAAC) o Stateless Address Auto-Cofiguration (SLAAC)
* IEEE 802 48-bit MAC or IEEE EUI-64 identifier * IEEE 802 48-bit MAC or IEEE EUI-64 identifier [RFC2464]
[RFC1972][RFC2464]
* Cryptographically generated [RFC3972] * Cryptographically generated [RFC3972]
* Temporary (also known as "privacy addresses") [RFC4941] * Temporary (also known as "privacy addresses") [RFC4941]
* Constant, semantically opaque (also known as random) * Constant, semantically opaque (also known as random)
[Microsoft] [Microsoft]
* Stable, semantically opaque [RFC7217] * Stable, semantically opaque [RFC7217]
o DHCPv6-based [RFC3315] o DHCPv6-based [RFC3315]
o Specified by transition/co-existence technologies o Specified by transition/co-existence technologies
* IPv4 address and port [RFC4380] * IPv4 address and port [RFC4380]
Deriving the IID from a globally unique IEEE identifier [RFC1971] was Deriving the IID from a globally unique IEEE identifier [RFC2464]
one of the earliest mechanisms developed. A number of privacy and [RFC4862] was one of the earliest mechanisms developed (and
security issues related to the IIDs derived from IEEE identifiers originally specified in [RFC1971] and [RFC1972]). A number of
were discovered after their standardization, and many of the privacy and security issues related to the IIDs derived from IEEE
mechanisms developed later aimed to mitigate some or all of these identifiers were discovered after their standardization, and many of
the mechanisms developed later aimed to mitigate some or all of these
weaknesses. This document identifies four types of threats against weaknesses. This document identifies four types of threats against
IEEE-identifier-based IIDs, and discusses how other existing IEEE-identifier-based IIDs, and discusses how other existing
techniques for generating IIDs do or do not mitigate those threats. techniques for generating IIDs do or do not mitigate those threats.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
This section clarifies the terminology used throughout this document. This section clarifies the terminology used throughout this document.
Public address: Public address:
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[RFC2119]. These words take their normative meanings only when they [RFC2119]. These words take their normative meanings only when they
are presented in ALL UPPERCASE. are presented in ALL UPPERCASE.
3. Weaknesses in IEEE-identifier-based IIDs 3. Weaknesses in IEEE-identifier-based IIDs
There are a number of privacy and security implications that exist There are a number of privacy and security implications that exist
for hosts that use IEEE-identifier-based IIDs. This section for hosts that use IEEE-identifier-based IIDs. This section
discusses four generic attack types: correlation of activities over discusses four generic attack types: correlation of activities over
time, location tracking, address scanning, and device-specific time, location tracking, address scanning, and device-specific
vulnerability exploitation. The first three of these rely on the vulnerability exploitation. The first three of these rely on the
attacker first gaining knowledge of the target host's IID. This can attacker first gaining knowledge of the target host's IID. This
be achieved by a number of different attackers: the operator of a could be achieved by a number of different entities: the operator of
server to which the host connects, such as a web server or a peer-to- a server to which the host connects, such as a web server or a peer-
peer server; an entity that connects to the same IPv6 link as the to-peer server; an entity that connects to the same IPv6 link as the
target (such as a conference network or any public network); or an target (such as a conference network or any public network); or an
entity that is on-path to the destinations with which the host entity that is on-path to the destinations with which the host
communicates, such as a network operator. communicates, such as a network operator.
3.1. Correlation of activities over time 3.1. Correlation of activities over time
As with other identifiers, an IPv6 address can be used to correlate As with other identifiers, an IPv6 address can be used to correlate
the activities of a host for at least as long as the lifetime of the the activities of a host for at least as long as the lifetime of the
address. The correlation made possible by IEEE-identifier-based IIDs address. The correlation made possible by IEEE-identifier-based IIDs
is of particular concern since they last roughly for the lifetime of is of particular concern since they last roughly for the lifetime of
skipping to change at page 14, line 26 skipping to change at page 14, line 26
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005. Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", [RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, March 2005. RFC 3972, March 2005.
[RFC4380] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through [RFC4380] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380, February Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380, February
2006. 2006.
[RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.
[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy [RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6", RFC 4941, September 2007. IPv6", RFC 4941, September 2007.
[RFC5991] Thaler, D., Krishnan, S., and J. Hoagland, "Teredo [RFC5991] Thaler, D., Krishnan, S., and J. Hoagland, "Teredo
Security Updates", RFC 5991, September 2010. Security Updates", RFC 5991, September 2010.
[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, [RFC6724] Thaler, D., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6)", RFC 6724, September 2012. (IPv6)", RFC 6724, September 2012.
skipping to change at page 15, line 8 skipping to change at page 15, line 15
[Broersma] [Broersma]
Broersma, R., "IPv6 Everywhere: Living with a Fully Broersma, R., "IPv6 Everywhere: Living with a Fully
IPv6-enabled environment", Australian IPv6 Summit 2010, IPv6-enabled environment", Australian IPv6 Summit 2010,
Melbourne, VIC Australia, October 2010, October 2010, Melbourne, VIC Australia, October 2010, October 2010,
<http://www.ipv6.org.au/10ipv6summit/talks/ <http://www.ipv6.org.au/10ipv6summit/talks/
Ron_Broersma.pdf>. Ron_Broersma.pdf>.
[CGA-IPR] IETF, "Intellectual Property Rights on RFC 3972", 2005. [CGA-IPR] IETF, "Intellectual Property Rights on RFC 3972", 2005.
[I-D.ietf-dhc-stable-privacy-addresses] [I-D.ietf-dhc-stable-privacy-addresses]
Gont, F. and W. Will, "A Method for Generating Gont, F. and S. LIU, "A Method for Generating Semantically
Semantically Opaque Interface Identifiers with Dynamic Opaque Interface Identifiers with Dynamic Host
Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", draft- Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", draft-ietf-dhc-
ietf-dhc-stable-privacy-addresses-02 (work in progress), stable-privacy-addresses-02 (work in progress), April
April 2015. 2015.
[I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning] [I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning]
Gont, F. and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6 Gont, F. and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6
Networks", draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning-06 (work in Networks", draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning-07 (work in
progress), February 2015. progress), April 2015.
[KAME-CGA] [KAME-CGA]
KAME, "The KAME IPR policy and concerns of some KAME, "The KAME IPR policy and concerns of some
technologies which have IPR claims", 2005, technologies which have IPR claims", 2005,
<http://www.kame.net/newsletter/20040525/>. <http://www.kame.net/newsletter/20040525/>.
[Microsoft] [Microsoft]
Microsoft, "IPv6 interface identifiers", 2013, <target='ht Microsoft, "IPv6 interface identifiers", 2013, <target='ht
tp://www.microsoft.com/resources/documentation/windows/xp/ tp://www.microsoft.com/resources/documentation/windows/xp/
all/proddocs/en-us/sag_ip_v6_imp_addr7.mspx?mfr=true>. all/proddocs/en-us/sag_ip_v6_imp_addr7.mspx?mfr=true>.
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