[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: (draft-fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation) 00 01 02 03 04

RATS Working Group                                      G. Fedorkow, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                    Juniper Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                                   E. Voit
Expires: January 13, 2021                            Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                     J. Fitzgerald-McKay
                                                National Security Agency
                                                           July 12, 2020


         TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification
           draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-01

Abstract

   This document describes a workflow for remote attestation of the
   integrity of network devices.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.4.  Description of Remote Integrity Verification (RIV)  . . .   5
     1.5.  Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.6.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       1.6.1.  Out of Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   2.  Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.1.  RIV Software Configuration Attestation using TPM  . . . .   8
       2.1.1.  What Does RIV Attest? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.2.  RIV Keying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.3.  RIV Information Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.4.  RIV Simplifying Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.4.1.  Reference Integrity Manifests (RIMs)  . . . . . . . .  16
       2.4.2.  Attestation Logs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   3.  Standards Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     3.1.  Prerequisites for RIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       3.1.1.  Unique Device Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.1.2.  Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.1.3.  Appraisal Policy for Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     3.2.  Reference Model for Challenge-Response  . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.2.1.  Transport and Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     3.3.  Centralized vs Peer-to-Peer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   4.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   6.  Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   8.  Appendix  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     8.1.  Layering Model for Network Equipment Attester and
           Verifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       8.1.1.  Why is OS Attestation Different?  . . . . . . . . . .  31
     8.2.  Implementation Notes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     8.3.  Root of Trust for Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38

1.  Introduction

   There are many aspects to consider in fielding a trusted computing
   device, from operating systems to applications.  Mechanisms to prove
   that a device installed at a customer's site is authentic (i.e., not
   counterfeit) and has been configured with authorized software, all as
   part of a trusted supply chain, are just a few of the many aspects
   which need to be considered concurrently to have confidence that a
   device is truly trustworthy.



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   A generic architecture for remote attestation has been defined in
   [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture].  Additionally, the use case for
   remotely attesting networking devices is within Section 6 of
   [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases].  However, these documents do not
   provide sufficient guidance for equipment vendors and network
   operators to design, build, and deploy interoperable platforms.

   The intent of this document is to provide such guidance.  It does
   this by outlining the Remote Integrity Verification (RIV) problem,
   and then identifies elements that are necessary to get the complete,
   scalable attestation procedure working with commercial networking
   products such as routers, switches and firewalls.  An underlying
   assumption will be the availability within the device of a Trusted
   Platform Module (TPM) compliant cryptoprocessor to enable the remote
   trustworthy assessment of the device's software and hardware.

1.1.  Terminology

   A number of terms are reused from [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture].
   These include: Appraisal Policy for Attestation Result, Attestation
   Result, Attester, Endorser, Evidence, Relying Party, Verifier,
   Verifier Owner.

   Additionally, this document defines the following terms:

   Attestation: the process of creating, conveying and appraising
   assertions about Platform trustworthiness characteristics, including
   supply chain trust, identity, platform provenance, software
   configuration, hardware configuration, platform composition,
   compliance to test suites, functional and assurance evaluations, etc.

   The goal of attestation is simply to assure an administrator that the
   software that was launched when the device was last started is an
   authentic and untampered copy of the software that the device vendor
   shipped.

   Within the Trusted Computing Group context, attestation is the
   process by which an independent Verifier can obtain cryptographic
   proof as to the identity of the device in question, evidence of the
   integrity of software loaded on that device when it started up, and
   then verify that what's there is what's supposed to be there.  For
   networking equipment, a verifier capability can be embedded in a
   Network Management Station (NMS), a posture collection server, or
   other network analytics tool (such as a software asset management
   solution, or a threat detection and mitigation tool, etc.).  While
   informally referred to as attestation, this document focuses on a
   subset defined here as Remote Integrity Verification (RIV).  RIV
   takes a network equipment centric perspective that includes a set of



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   protocols and procedures for determining whether a particular device
   was launched with untampered software, starting from Roots of Trust.
   While there are many ways to accomplish attestation, RIV sets out a
   specific set of protocols and tools that work in environments
   commonly found in Networking Equipment.  RIV does not cover other
   platform characteristics that could be attested (e.g. geographic
   location, connectivity; see [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases]), although
   it does provide evidence of a secure infrastructure to increase the
   level of trust in other platform characteristics attested by other
   means (e.g., by Entity Attestation Tokens [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]).

1.2.  Document Organization

   The remainder of this document is organized into several sections:

   o  The remainder of this section covers goals and requirements, plus
      a top-level description of RIV

   o  The Solution Overview section outlines how RIV works

   o  The Standards Components section links components of RIV to
      normative standards.

   o  Privacy and Security shows how specific features of RIV contribute
      to the trustworthiness of the attestation result

   o  Supporting material is in an appendix at the end.

1.3.  Goals

   Network operators benefit from a trustworthy attestation mechanism
   that provides assurance that their network comprises authentic
   equipment, and has loaded software free of known vulnerabilities and
   unauthorized tampering.  In line with the overall goal of assuring
   integrity, attestation can be used for asset management,
   vulnerability and compliance assessment, plus configuration
   management.

   As a part of a trusted supply chain, the RIV attestation workflow
   outlined in this document is intended to meet the following high-
   level goals:

   o  Provable Device Identity - This specification requires that an
      attesting device includes a cryptographic identifier unique to
      each device.  Effectively this means that the TPM or equivalent
      cryptoprocessor must be so provisioned during the manufacturing
      cycle.




Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   o  Software Inventory - A key goal is to identify the software
      release installed on the attesting device, and to provide evidence
      that the software stored within hasn't been altered

   o  Verifiability - Verification of software and configuration of the
      device shows that the software that was authorized for
      installation by the administrator has actually been launched.

   In addition, RIV is designed to operate in a centralized environment,
   such as with a central authority that manages and configures a number
   of network devices, or 'peer-to-peer', where network devices
   independently verify one another to establish a trust relationship.
   (See Section 3.3 below, and also
   [I-D.voit-rats-trusted-path-routing])

1.4.  Description of Remote Integrity Verification (RIV)

   Attestation requires two interlocking services between the Attester
   network device and the Verifier::

   o  Platform Identity, the mechanism providing trusted identity, can
      reassure network managers that the specific devices they ordered
      from authorized manufacturers for attachment to their network are
      those that were installed, and that they continue to be present in
      their network.  As part of the mechanism for Platform Identity,
      cryptographic proof of the identity of the manufacturer is also
      provided.

   o  Software Measurement is the mechanism that reports the state of
      mutable software components on the device, and can assure network
      managers that they have known, untampered software configured to
      run in their network.

   Using these two interlocking services, RIV provides a procedure that
   assures a network operator that the equipment in their network can be
   reliably identified, and that untampered software of a known version
   is installed on each endpoint.  Equipment in the network includes
   devices that make up the network itself, such as routers, switches
   and firewalls.

   RIV includes several major processes:

   1.  Creation of Evidence is the process whereby an Attester generates
       cryptographic proof (Evidence) of claims about platform
       properties.  In particular, the platform identity and its
       software configuration are both of critical importance





Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   2.  Platform Identification refers to the mechanism assuring the
       Relying Party (ultimately, a network administrator) of the
       identity of devices that make up their network, and that their
       manufacturers are known.

   3.  Software used to boot a platform can be described as a chain of
       measurements, started by a Root of Trust for Measurement, that
       normally ends when the system software is loaded.  A measurement
       signifies the identity, integrity and version of each software
       component registered with an attesting device's TPM, so that the
       subsequent appraisal stage can determine if the software
       installed is authentic, up-to-date, and free of tampering.

   4.  Conveyance of Evidence reliably transports at least the minimum
       amount of Evidence from Attester to a Verifier to allow a
       management station to perform a meaningful appraisal in Step 5.
       The transport is typically carried out via a management network.
       The channel must provide integrity and authenticity, and, in some
       use cases, may also require confidentiality.

   5.  Finally, Appraisal of Evidence occurs.  As the Verifier and
       Relying Party roles are often combined within RIV, this is the
       process of verifying the Evidence received by a Verifier from the
       Attesting device, and using an Appraisal Policy to develop an
       Attestation Result, used to inform decision making.  In practice,
       this means comparing the device measurements reported as Evidence
       with the Attester configuration expected by the Verifier.
       Subsequently the Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results might
       match what was found against Reference Integrity Measurements
       (aka Golden Measurements) which represent the intended configured
       state of the connected device.

   All implementations supporting this RIV specification require the
   support of the following three technologies: 1.  Identity: Platform
   identity can be based on IEEE 802.1AR Device Identity [IEEE-802-1AR],
   coupled with careful supply-chain management by the manufacturer.
   The DevID certificate contains a statement by the manufacturer that
   establishes the identity of the device as it left the factory.  Some
   applications with a more-complex post-manufacture supply chain (e.g.
   Value Added Resellers), or with different privacy concerns, may want
   to use alternative mechanisms for platform authentication (for
   example, TCG Platform Certificates [Platform-Certificates]).

   1.  Platform Attestation provides evidence of configuration of
       software elements present in the device.  This form of
       attestation can be implemented with TPM PCR, Quote and Log
       mechanisms, which provide an authenticated mechanism to report
       what software was started on the device through the boot cycle.



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


       Successful attestation requires an unbroken chain from a boot-
       time root of trust through all layers of software needed to bring
       the device to an operational state.

   2.  Reference Integrity Measurements must be conveyed from the
       Endorser (the entity accepted as the software authority, often
       the manufacturer for embedded systems) to the system in which
       verification will take place

1.5.  Solution Requirements

   Remote Integrity Verification must address the "Lying Endpoint"
   problem, in which malicious software on an endpoint may subvert the
   intended function, and also prevent the endpoint from reporting its
   compromised status.  (See Section 5 for further Security
   Considerations)

   RIV attestation is designed to be simple to deploy at scale.  RIV
   should work "out of the box" as far as possible, that is, with the
   fewest possible provisioning steps or configuration databases needed
   at the end-user's site, as network equipment is often required to
   "self-configure", to reliably reach out without manual intervention
   to prove its identity and operating posture, then download its own
   configuration.  See [RFC8572] for an example of Secure Zero Touch
   Provisioning.

1.6.  Scope

   Remote Attestation is a very general problem that could apply to most
   network-connected computing devices.  However, this document includes
   several assumptions that limit the scope to Network Equipment (e.g.
   routers, switches and firewalls):

   o  This solution is for use in non-privacy-preserving applications
      (for example, networking, Industrial IoT), avoiding the need for a
      Privacy Certificate Authority for attestation keys
      [AIK-Enrollment] or TCG Platform Certificates
      [Platform-Certificates]

   o  This document assumes network protocols that are common in
      networking equipment such as YANG [RFC7950] and NETCONF [RFC6241],
      but not generally used in other applications.

   o  The approach outlined in this document mandates the use of TPM 1.2
      or TPM 2.0.  Other roots of trust could be used with the same
      information flow, although different data structures would likely
      be called for.




Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


1.6.1.  Out of Scope

   o  Run-Time Attestation: Run-time attestation of Linux or other
      multi-threaded operating system processes considerably expands the
      scope of the problem.  Many researchers are working on that
      problem, but this document defers the run-time attestation
      problem.

   o  Multi-Vendor Embedded Systems: Additional coordination would be
      needed for devices that themselves comprise hardware and software
      from multiple vendors, integrated by the end user.

   o  Processor Sleep Modes: Network equipment typically does not
      "sleep", so sleep and hibernate modes are not considered.
      Although out of scope for RIV, Trusted Computing Group
      specifications do encompass sleep and hibernate states.

   o  Virtualization and Containerization: In a non-virtualized system,
      the host OS is responsible for measuring each Userland file or
      process, but that't the end of the chain of trust.  For
      virtualized systems, the host OS must verify the hypervisor, which
      then manages its own chain of trust through the virtual machine.
      Virtualization and containerization technologies are increasingly
      used in Network equipment, but are not considered in this revision
      of the document.

2.  Solution Overview

2.1.  RIV Software Configuration Attestation using TPM

   RIV Attestation is a process which can be used to determine the
   identity of software running on a specifically-identified device.
   Remote Attestation is broken into two phases, shown in Figure 1:

   o  During system startup, each distinct software object is
      "measured".  Its identity, hash (i.e. cryptographic digest) and
      version information are recorded in a log.  Hashes are also
      extended, or cryptographically folded, into the TPM, in a way that
      can be used to validate the log entries.  The measurement process
      generally follows the Chain of Trust model used in Measured Boot,
      where each stage of the system measures the next one, and extends
      its measurement into the TPM, before launching it.

   o  Once the device is running and has operational network
      connectivity, a separate, trusted Verifier will interrogate the
      network device to retrieve the logs and a copy of the digests
      collected by hashing each software object, signed by an
      attestation private key known only to the TPM.



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   The result is that the Verifier can verify the device's identity by
   checking the certificate containing the TPM's attestation public key,
   and can validate the software that was launched by comparing digests
   in the log with known-good values, and verifying their correctness by
   comparing with the signed digests from the TPM.

   It should be noted that attestation and identity are inextricably
   linked; signed Evidence that a particular version of software was
   loaded is of little value without cryptographic proof of the identity
   of the Attester producing the Evidence.

       +-------------------------------------------------------+
       | +--------+    +--------+   +--------+    +---------+  |
       | | BIOS   |--->| Loader |-->| Kernel |--->|Userland |  |
       | +--------+    +--------+   +--------+    +---------+  |
       |     |            |           |                        |
       |     |            |           |                        |
       |     +------------+-----------+-+                      |
       |                        Step 1  |                      |
       |                                V                      |
       |                            +--------+                 |
       |                            |  TPM   |                 |
       |                            +--------+                 |
       |   Router                       |                      |
       +--------------------------------|----------------------+
                                        |
                                        |  Step 2
                                        |    +-----------+
                                        +--->| Verifier  |
                                             +-----------+

       Reset---------------flow-of-time-during-boot--...------->

                      Figure 1: RIV Attestation Model

   In Step 1, measurements are "extended" into the TPM as processes
   start.  In Step 2, signed PCR digests are retrieved from the TPM for
   off-box analysis after the system is operational.

2.1.1.  What Does RIV Attest?

   TPM attestation is strongly focused on Platform Configuration
   Registers (PCRs), but those registers are only vehicles for
   certifying accompanying Evidence, conveyed in log entries.  It is the
   hashes in log entries that are extended into PCRs, where the final
   digests can be retrieved in the form of a Quote signed by a key known
   only to the TPM.  The use of multiple PCRs serves only to provide
   some independence between different classes of object, so that one



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   class of objects can be updated without changing the extended hash
   for other classes.  Although PCRs can be used for any purpose, this
   section outlines the objects within the scope of this document which
   may be extended into the TPM.

   In general, PCRs are organized to independently attest three classes
   of object:

   o  Code, i.e., instructions to be executed by a CPU.

   o  Configuration - Many devices offer numerous options controlled by
      non-volatile configuration variables which can impact the device's
      security posture.  These settings may have vendor defaults, but
      often can be changed by administrators, who may want to verify via
      attestation that the settings they intend are still in place.

   o  Credentials - Administrators may wish to verify via attestation
      that keys (and other credentials) outside the Root of Trust have
      not been subject to unauthorized tampering.  (By definition, keys
      inside the root of trust can't be verified independently)

   The TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification
   [PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-2.0] gives considerable detail on what is to be
   measured during the boot phase of a platform boot using a UEFI BOIS
   (www.uefi.org), but the goal is simply to measure every bit of code
   executed in the process of starting the device, along with any
   configuration information related to security posture, leaving no gap
   for unmeasured code to subvert the chain.

   For platforms using a UEFI BIOS, [PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-2.0] gives
   detailed normative requirements for PCR usage.  But for other
   platform architectures, the table in Figure 2 gives guidance for PCR
   assignment that generalizes the specific details of
   [PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-2.0].

   By convention, most PCRs are allocated in pairs, which the even-
   numbered PCR used to measure executable code, and the odd-numbered
   PCR used to measure whatever data and configuration are associated
   with that code.  It is important to note that each PCR may contain
   results from dozens (or even thousands) of individual measurements.











Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   +------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                                            |   Allocated PCR #   |
   | Function                                   | Code | Configuration|
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   | Firmware Static Root of Trust, i.e.,       |  0   |    1         |
   | initial boot firmware and drivers          |      |              |
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   | Drivers and initialization for optional    |  2   |    3         |
   | or add-in devices                          |      |              |
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   | OS Loader code and configuration, i.e.,    |  4   |    5         |
   | the code launched by firmware to load an   |      |              |
   | operating system kernel. These PCRs record |      |              |
   | each boot attempt, and an identifier for   |      |              |
   | where the loader was found                 |      |              |
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   | Vendor Specific Measurements during boot   |  6   |    6         |
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   | Secure Boot Policy.  This PCR records keys |      |    7         |
   | and configuration used to validate the OS  |      |              |
   | loader                                     |      |              |
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   | Measurements made by the OS Loader         |  8   |    9         |
   | (e.g GRUB2 for Linux)                      |      |              |
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   | Measurements made by OS (e.g. Linux IMA)   |  10  |    10        |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------+

                        Figure 2: Attested Objects

   Notes on PCR Allocations

   It is important to recognize that PCR[0] is critical.  The first
   measurement into PCR[0] taken by the Root of Trust for Measurement,
   is critical to establishing the chain of trust for all subsequent
   measurements.  If the PCR[0] measurement cannot be trusted, the
   validity of the entire chain is put into question.

   Distinctions Between PCR[0], PCR[2], PCR[4] and PCR[8]

   o  PCR[0] typically represents a consistent view of the Host Platform
      between boot cycles, allowing Attestation and Sealed Storage
      policies to be defined using the less changeable components of the
      transitive trust chain.  This PCR typically provides a consistent
      view of the platform regardless of user selected options.

   o  PCR[2] is intended to represent a "user configurable" environment
      where the user has the ability to alter the components that are



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


      measured into PCR[2].  This is typically done by adding adapter
      cards, etc., into user-accessible PCI or other slots.  In UEFI
      systems these devices may be configured by Option ROMsm easured
      into PCR[2] and executed by the BIOS.

   o  PCR[4] is intended to represent the software that manages the
      transition between the platform's Pre-Operating System Start and
      the state of a system with the Operating System present.  This
      PCR, along with PCR[5], identifies the initial operating system
      loader (e.g.  GRUB for Linux)

   o  PCR[8] is used by the OS loader to record measurements of the
      various components of the operating system.

   Although the TCG PC Client document specifies the use of the first
   eight PCRs very carefully to ensure interoperability among multiple
   UEFI BIOS vendors, it should be noted that embedded software vendors
   may have considerably more flexibility.  Verifiers typically need to
   know which log entries are consequential and which are not (possibly
   controlled by local policies) but the verifier may not need to know
   what each log entry means or why it was assigned to a particular PCR.
   Designers must recognize that some PCRs may cover log entries that a
   particular verifier considers critical and other log entries that are
   not considered important, so differing PCR values may not on their
   own constitute a check for authenticity.

   Designers may allocate particular events to specific PCRs in order to
   achieve a particular objective with Local Attestation, i.e., allowing
   a procedure to execute only if a given PCR is in a given state.  It
   may also be important to designers to consider whether streaming
   notification of PCR updates is required (see ID Rats Streaming).
   Specific log entries can only be validated if the verifier receives
   every log entry affecting the relevant PCR, so (for example) a
   designer might want to separate rare, high-value events such as
   configuration changes, from high-volume, routine measurements such as
   IMA logs.

2.2.  RIV Keying

   RIV attestation relies on two keys:

   o  An identity key is required to certify the identity of the
      Attester itself.  RIV specifies the use of an IEEE 802.1AR DevID
      [IEEE-802-1AR], signed by the device manufacturer, containing the
      device serial number.

   o  An Attestation Key is required to sign the Quote generated by the
      TPM to report evidence of software configuration.



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   In TPM application, the Attestation key must be protected by the TPM,
   and the DevID should be as well.  Depending on other TPM
   configuration procedures, the two keys may be different.  Some of the
   considerations are outlined in TCG Guidance for Securing Network
   Equipment [NetEq].

   TCG Guidance for Securing Network Equipment specifies further
   conventions for these keys:

   o  When separate Identity and Attestation keys are used, the
      Attestation Key (AK) and its x.509 certificate should parallel the
      DevID, with the same device ID information as the DevID
      certificate (i.e., the same Subject Name and Subject Alt Name,
      even though the key pairs are different).  This allows a quote
      from the device, signed by an AK, to be linked directly to the
      device that provided it, by examining the corresponding AK
      certificate.

   o  Network devices that are expected to use secure zero touch
      provisioning as specified in [RFC8572]) must be shipped by the
      manufacturer with pre-provisioned keys (Initial DevID and AK,
      called IDevID and IAK).  Inclusion of an DevID and IAK by a vendor
      does not preclude a mechanism whereby an Administrator can define
      Local Identity and Attestation Keys (LDevID and LAK) if desired.

2.3.  RIV Information Flow

   RIV workflow for networking equipment is organized around a simple
   use-case, where a network operator wishes to verify the integrity of
   software installed in specific, fielded devices.  This use-case
   implies several components:

   1.  The Attesting Device, which the network operator wants to
       examine.

   2.  A Verifier (which might be a network management station)
       somewhere separate from the Device that will retrieve the
       information and analyze it to pass judgment on the security
       posture of the device.

   3.  A Relying Party, which can act on Attestation results.
       Interaction between the Relying Party and the Verifier is
       considered out of scope for RIV.

   4.  Signed Reference Integrity Manifests (RIMs), containing Reference
       Integrity Measurements, can either be created by the device
       manufacturer and shipped along with the device as part of its
       software image, or alternatively, could be obtained several other



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 13]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


       ways (direct to the Verifier from the manufacturer, from a third
       party, from the owner's observation of what's thought to be a
       "known good system", etc.).  Retrieving RIMs from the device
       itself allows attestation to be done in systems which may not
       have access to the public internet, or by other devices that are
       not management stations per-se (e.g., a peer device; See
       Section 3.1.3).  If reference measurements are obtained from
       multiple sources, the Verifier may need to evaluate the relative
       level of trust to be placed in each source in case of a
       discrepancy.

   These components are illustrated in Figure 2.

   A more-detailed taxonomy of terms is given in
   [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]

   +---------------+        +-------------+        +---------+--------+
   |               |        | Attester    | Step 1 | Verifier|        |
   | Endorser      |        | (Device     |<-------| (Network| Relying|
   | (Device       |        | under       |------->| Mngmt   | Party  |
   | Manufacturer  |        | attestation)| Step 2 | Station)|        |
   | or other      |        |             |        |         |        |
   | authority)    |        |             |        |         |        |
   +---------------+        +-------------+        +---------+--------+
          |                                             /\
          |                  Step 0                      |
          -----------------------------------------------


        Figure 3: RIV Reference Configuration for Network Equipment

   In Step 0, The Endorser (the device manufacturer) provides a Software
   Image to the Attester (the device under attestation), and makes one
   or more Reference Integrity Manifests (RIMs) signed by the Endorser,
   available to the Verifier (see Section 3.1.3 for "in-band" and "out
   of band" ways to make this happen).  In Step 1, the Verifier (Network
   Management Station), on behalf of a Relying Party, requests Identity,
   Measurement Values (and possibly RIMs) from the Attester.  In Step 2,
   the Attester responds to the request by providing a DevID, quotes
   (measured values), and optionally RIMs, signed by the Attester.

   The following standards components may be used:

   1.  TPM Keys are configured according to [Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0],
       [PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-1.2], or [Platform-ID-TPM-1.2]






Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 14]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   2.  Measurements of firmware and bootable modules may be taken
       according to TCG PC Client [PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-2.0] and Linux IMA
       [IMA]

   3.  Device Identity is managed by IEEE 802.1AR certificates
       [IEEE-802-1AR], with keys protected by TPMs.

   4.  Attestation logs may be formatted according to the Canonical
       Event Log format [Canonical-Event-Log], although other
       specialized formats may be used.

   5.  Quotes are retrieved from the TPM according to the TCG TAP
       Information Model [TAP].  While the TAP IM gives a protocol-
       independent description of the data elements involved, it's
       important to note that quotes from the TPM are signed inside the
       TPM, so must be retrieved in a way that does not invalidate the
       signature, as specified in [I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra], to
       preserve the trust model.  (See Section 5 Security
       Considerations).

   6.  Reference Integrity Measurements may be encoded as CoSWID tags,
       as defined in the TCG RIM document [RIM], compatible with NIST IR
       8060 [NIST-IR-8060] and the IETF CoSWID draft
       [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid].  See Section 2.4.1.

2.4.  RIV Simplifying Assumptions

   This document makes the following simplifying assumptions to reduce
   complexity:

   o  The product to be attested is shipped with an IEEE 802.1AR DevID
      and an Initial Attestation Key (IAK) with certificate.  The IAK
      cert contains the same identity information as the DevID
      (specifically, the same Subject Name and Subject Alt Name, signed
      by the manufacturer), but it's a type of key that can be used to
      sign a TPM Quote.  This convention is described in TCG Guidance
      for Securing Network Equipment [NetEq].  For network equipment,
      which is generally non-privacy-sensitive, shipping a device with
      both an IDevID and an IAK already provisioned substantially
      simplifies initial startup.  Privacy-sensitive applications may
      use the TCG Platform Certificate and additional procedures to
      install identity credentials on the platform after manufacture.

   o  The product is equipped with a Root of Trust for Measurement, Root
      of Trust for Storage and Root of Trust for Reporting (as defined
      in [GloPlaRoT]) that are capable of conforming to the TCG Trusted
      Attestation Protocol (TAP) Information Model [TAP].




Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 15]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   o  The vendor will ship Reference Integrity Measurements (i.e.,
      known-good measurements) in the form of signed CoSWID tags
      [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid], [SWID], as described in TCG Reference
      Integrity Measurement Manifest Information Model [RIM].

2.4.1.  Reference Integrity Manifests (RIMs)

   [I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra] focuses on collecting and
   transmitting evidence in the form of PCR measurements and attestation
   logs.  But the critical part of the process is enabling the verifier
   to decide whether the measurements are "the right ones" or not.

   While it must be up to network administrators to decide what they
   want on their networks, the software supplier should supply the
   Reference Integrity Measurements that may be used by a verifier to
   determine if evidence shows known good, known bad or unknown software
   configurations.

   In general, there are two kinds of reference measurements:

   1.  Measurements of early system startup (e.g., BIOS, boot loader, OS
       kernel) are essentially single threaded, and executed exactly
       once, in a known sequence, before any results could be reported.
       In this case, while the method for computing the hash and
       extending relevant PCRs may be complicated, the net result is
       that the software (more likely, firmware) vendor will have one
       known good PCR value that "should" be present in the relevant
       PCRs after the box has booted.  In this case, the signed
       reference measurement could simply list the expected hashes for
       the given version.  However, a RIM that contains the intermediate
       hashes can be useful in debugging cases where the expected final
       hash is not the one reported.

   2.  Measurements taken later in operation of the system, once an OS
       has started (for example, Linux IMA[IMA]), may be more complex,
       with unpredictable "final" PCR values.  In this case, the
       Verifier must have enough information to reconstruct the expected
       PCR values from logs and signed reference measurements from a
       trusted authority.

   In both cases, the expected values can be expressed as signed SWID or
   CoSWID tags, but the SWID structure in the second case is somewhat
   more complex, as reconstruction of the extended hash in a PCR may
   involve thousands of files and other objects.

   The TCG has published an information model defining elements of
   reference integrity manifests under the title TCG Reference Integrity
   Manifest Information Model [RIM].  This information model outlines



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 16]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   how SWID tags should be structured to allow attestation, and defines
   "bundles" of SWID tags that may be needed to describe a complete
   software release.  The RIM contains metadata relating to the software
   release it belongs to, plus hashes for each individual file or other
   object that could be attested.

   TCG has also published the PC Client Reference Integrity Measurement
   specification [PC-Client-RIM], which focuses on a SWID-compatible
   format suitable for expressing expected measurement values in the
   specific case of a UEFI-compatible BIOS, where the SWID focus on
   files and file systems is not a direct fit.  While the PC Client RIM
   is not directly applicable to network equipment, many vendors do use
   a conventional UEFI BIOS to launch their network OS.

2.4.2.  Attestation Logs

   Quotes from a TPM can provide evidence of the state of a device up to
   the time the evidence was recorded, but to make sense of the quote in
   most cases an event log that identifies which software modules
   contributed which values to the quote during startup must also be
   provided.  The log must contain enough information to demonstrate its
   integrity by allowing exact reconstruction of the digest conveyed in
   the signed quote (i.e., PCR values).

   There are multiple event log formats which may be supported as viable
   formats of Evidence between the Attester and Verifier:

   o  Event log exports from [I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra]

   o  IMA Event log file exports [IMA]

   o  TCG UEFI BIOS event log (TCG EFI Platform Specification for TPM
      Family 1.1 or 1.2, Section 7 [EFI-TPM])

   o  TCG Canonical Event Log [Canonical-Event-Log]

3.  Standards Components

3.1.  Prerequisites for RIV

   The Reference Interaction Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote
   Attestation is based on the standard roles defined in
   [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture].  However additional prerequisites must
   be established to allow for interoperable RIV use case
   implementations.  These prerequisites are intended to provide
   sufficient context information so that the Verifier can acquire and
   evaluate Attester measurements.




Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 17]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


3.1.1.  Unique Device Identity

   A Secure device Identity (DevID) in the form of an IEEE 802.1AR
   certificate [IEEE-802-1AR] must be provisioned in the Attester's
   TPMs.

3.1.2.  Keys

   The Attestation Identity Key (AIK) and certificate must also be
   provisioned on the Attester according to [Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0],
   [PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-1.2], or [Platform-ID-TPM-1.2].

   The Attester's TPM Keys must be associated with the DevID on the
   Verifier (see Section 5 Security Considerations).

3.1.3.  Appraisal Policy for Evidence

   (Editor's Note - terminology in this section must be brought back
   into line with the RATS Architecture definitions)

   The Verifier must obtain the Appraisal Policy for Evidence.  This
   policy may be in the form of reference measurements (e.g., Known Good
   Values, CoSWID tags [I-D.birkholz-yang-swid]).  These reference
   measurements will eventually be compared to signed PCR Evidence
   acquired from an Attester's TPM.

   This document does not specify the format or contents for the
   Appraisal Policy for Evidence.  But acquiring this policy may happen
   in one of two ways:

   1.  a Verifier obtains reference measurements directly from a
       Verifier Owner (i.e., a Device Configuration Authority) chosen by
       the Verifier administrator.

   2.  Signed reference measurements may be distributed by the Verifier
       Owner to the Attester.  From there, the reference measurement may
       be acquired by the Verifier.














Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 18]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   *************         .-------------.         .-----------.
   * Verifier  *         | Attester    |         | Verifier/ |
   * Owner     *         |             |         | Relying   |
   *(Device    *----2--->| (Network    |----2--->| Party     |
   * config    *         |  Device)    |         |(Ntwk Mgmt |
   * Authority)*         |             |         |  Station) |
   *************         '-------------'         '-----------'
           |                                           ^
           |                                           |
           '----------------1--------------------------'

           Figure 4: Appraisal Policy for Evidence Prerequisites

   In either case the Appraisal Policy for Evidence must be generated,
   acquired and delivered in a secure way.  This includes reference
   measurements of:

   o  firmware and bootable modules taken according to TCG PC Client
      [PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-2.0] and Linux IMA [IMA]

   o  encoded CoSWID tags signed by the device manufacturer, are as
      defined in the TCG RIM document [RIM], compatible with NIST IR
      8060 [NIST-IR-8060] and the IETF CoSWID draft
      [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid].

3.2.  Reference Model for Challenge-Response

   Once the prerequisites for RIV are met, a Verifier may acquire
   Evidence from an Attester.  The following diagram illustrates a RIV
   information flow between a Verifier and an Attester.  Event times
   shown correspond to the time types described within Appendix A of
   [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]:



















Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 19]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


.----------.                                .--------------------------.
| Attester |                                | Relying Party / Verifier |
'----------'                                '--------------------------'
   time(VG)                                                       |
valueGeneration(targetEnvironment)                                |
     | => claims                                                  |
     |                                                            |
     | <--------------requestEvidence(nonce, PcrSelection)-----time(NS)
     |                                                            |
   time(EG)                                                       |
evidenceGeneration(nonce, PcrSelection, collectedClaims)          |
     | => SignedPcrEvidence(nonce, PcrSelection)                  |
     | => LogEvidence(collectedClaims)                            |
     |                                                            |
     | returnSignedPcrEvidence----------------------------------> |
     | returnLogEvidence----------------------------------------> |
     |                                                            |
     |                                                       time(RG,RA)
     |         evidenceAppraisal(SignedPcrEvidence, eventLog, refClaims)
     |                                       attestationResult <= |
     ~                                                            ~
     |                                                          time(RX)

                Figure 5: IETF Attestation Information Flow

   o  time(VG): One or more Attesting Network Device PCRs are extended
      with measurements.

   o  time(NS): The Verifier generates a unique nonce ("number used
      once"), and makes a request attestation data for one or more PCRs
      from an Attester.  This can be accomplished via a YANG [RFC7950]
      interface that implements the TCG TAP model (e.g.  YANG Module for
      Basic Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation Procedures
      [I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra]).

   o  time(EG): On the Attester, measured values are retrieved from the
      Attester's TPM.  This requested PCR evidence is signed by the
      Attestation Identity Key (AIK) associated with the DevID.  Quotes
      are retrieved according to TCG TAP Information Model [TAP].  While
      the TAP IM gives a protocol-independent description of the data
      elements involved, it's important to note that quotes from the TPM
      are signed inside the TPM, so must be retrieved in a way that does
      not invalidate the signature, as specified in
      [I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra], to preserve the trust model.
      (See Section 5 Security Considerations).  At the same time, the
      Attester collects log evidence showing what values have been
      extended into that PCR.




Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 20]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   o  Collected Evidence is passed from the Attester to the Verifier

   o  time(RG,RA): The Verifier reviews the Evidence and takes action as
      needed.  As the Relying Party and Verifier are assumed co-
      resident, this can happen in one step.

      *  If the signed PCR values do not match the set of log entries
         which have extended a particular PCR, the device should not be
         trusted.

      *  If the log entries that the verifier considers important do not
         match known good values, the device should not be trusted.  We
         note that the process of collecting and analyzing the log can
         be omitted if the value in the relevant PCR is already a known-
         good value.

      *  If the set of log entries are not seen as acceptable by the
         Appraisal Policy for Evidence, the device should not be
         trusted.

      *  If the AIK signature is not correct, or freshness such as that
         provided by the nonce is not included in the response, the
         device should not be trusted.

   o  time(RX): At some point after the verification of Evidence, the
      Attester can no longer be considered Attested as trustworthy.

3.2.1.  Transport and Encoding

   Network Management systems may retrieve signed PCR based Evidence as
   shown in Figure 5, and can be accomplished via:

   o  XML, JSON, or CBOR encoded Evidence, using

   o  RESTCONF or NETCONF transport, over a

   o  TLS or SSH secure tunnel

   Retrieval of Log Evidence will be via log interfaces on the network
   device.  (For example, see [I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra]).

3.3.  Centralized vs Peer-to-Peer

   Figure 5 above assumes that the Verifier is implicitly trusted, while
   the Attesting device is not.  In a Peer-to-Peer application such as
   two routers negotiating a trust relationship
   [I-D.voit-rats-trusted-path-routing], the two peers can each ask the
   other to prove software integrity.  In this application, the



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 21]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   information flow is the same, but each side plays a role both as an
   Attester and a Verifier.  Each device issues a challenge, and each
   device responds to the other's challenge, as shown in Figure 6.
   Peer-to-peer challenges, particularly if used to establish a trust
   relationship between routers, require devices to carry their own
   signed reference measurements (RIMs) so that each device has
   everything needed for attestation, without having to resort to a
   central authority.

 +---------------+                             +---------------+
 |               |                             |               |
 | Endorser A    |                             | Endorser B    |
 | Firmware      |                             | Firmware      |
 | Configuration |                             | Configuration |
 | Authority     |                             | Authority     |
 |               |                             |               |
 +---------------+                             +---------------+
        |                                              |
        |       +-------------+        +------------+  |
        |       |             | Step 1 |            |  |   \
        |       | Attester    |<------>| Verifier   |  |   |
        |       |             |<------>|            |  |   |  Router B
        +------>|             | Step 2 |            |  |   |- Challenges
         Step 0A|             |        |            |  |   |  Router A
                |             |------->|            |  |   |
                |- Router A --| Step 3 |- Router B -|  |   /
                |             |        |            |  |
                |             |        |            |  |
                |             | Step 1 |            |  |   \
                | Verifier    |<------>| Attester   |<-+   |  Router A
                |             |<------>|            |      |- Challenges
                |             | Step 2 |            |      |  Router B
                |             |        |            |      |
                |             |<-------|            |      |
                +-------------+ Step 3 +------------+      /


            Figure 6: Peer-to-Peer Attestation Information Flow

   In this application, each device may need to be equipped with signed
   RIMs to act as an Attester, and also a selection of trusted x.509
   root certificates to allow the device to act as a Verifier.  An
   existing link layer protocol such as 802.1x [IEEE-802.1x] or 802.1AE
   [IEEE-802.1ae], with Evidence being enclosed over a variant of EAP
   [RFC3748] or LLDP [LLDP] are suitable methods for such an exchange.






Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 22]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


4.  Privacy Considerations

   Networking Equipment, such as routers, switches and firewalls, has a
   key role to play in guarding the privacy of individuals using the
   network:

   o  Packets passing through the device must not be sent to
      unauthorized destinations.  For example:

      *  Routers often act as Policy Enforcement Points, where
         individual subscribers may be checked for authorization to
         access a network.  Subscriber login information must not be
         released to unauthorized parties.

      *  Networking Equipment is often called upon to block access to
         protected resources from unauthorized users.

   o  Routing information, such as the identity of a router's peers,
      must not be leaked to unauthorized neighbors.

   o  If configured, encryption and decryption of traffic must be
      carried out reliably, while protecting keys and credentials.

   Functions that protect privacy are implemented as part of each layer
   of hardware and software that makes up the networking device.  In
   light of these requirements for protecting the privacy of users of
   the network, the Network Equipment must identify itself, and its boot
   configuration and measured device state (for example, PCR values), to
   the Equipment's Administrator, so there's no uncertainty as to what
   function each device and configuration is configured to carry out.
   This allows the administrator to ensure that the network provides
   individual and peer privacy guarantees.

   RIV specifically addresses the collection of information from
   enterprise network devices by authorized agents of the enterprise.
   As such, privacy is a fundamental concern for those deploying this
   solution, given EU GDPR, California CCPA, and many other privacy
   regulations.  The enterprise should implement and enforce their duty
   of care.

   See [NetEq] for more context on privacy in networking devices

5.  Security Considerations

   Attestation results from the RIV procedure are subject to a number of
   attacks:

   o  Keys may be compromised



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 23]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   o  A counterfeit device may attempt to impersonate (spoof) a known
      authentic device

   o  Man-in-the-middle attacks may be used by a counterfeit device to
      attempt to deliver responses that originate in an actual authentic
      device

   o  Replay attacks may be attempted by a compromised device

   Trustworthiness of RIV attestation depends strongly on the validity
   of keys used for identity and attestation reports.  RIV takes full
   advantage of TPM capabilities to ensure that results can be trusted.

   Two sets of keys are relevant to RIV attestation

   o  A DevID key is used to certify the identity of the device in which
      the TPM is installed.

   o  An Attestation Key (AK) key signs attestation reports, (called
      'quotes' in TCG documents), used to provide evidence for integrity
      of the software on the device.

   TPM practices usually require that these keys be different, as a way
   of ensuring that a general-purpose signing key cannot be used to
   spoof an attestation quote.

   In each case, the private half of the key is known only to the TPM,
   and cannot be retrieved externally, even by a trusted party.  To
   ensure that's the case, specification-compliant private/public key-
   pairs are generated inside the TPM, where they're never exposed, and
   cannot be extracted (See [Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0]).

   Keeping keys safe is just part of attestation security; knowing which
   keys are bound to the device in question is just as important.

   While there are many ways to manage keys in a TPM (See
   [Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0]), RIV includes support for "zero touch"
   provisioning (also known as zero-touch onboarding) of fielded devices
   (e.g.  Secure ZTP, [RFC8572]), where keys which have predictable
   trust properties are provisioned by the device vendor.

   Device identity in RIV is based on IEEE 802.1AR DevID.  This
   specification provides several elements

   o  A DevID requires a unique key pair for each device, accompanied by
      an x.509 certificate





Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 24]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   o  The private portion of the DevID key is to be stored in the
      device, in a manner that provides confidentiality (Section 6.2.5
      [IEEE-802-1AR])

   The x.509 certificate contains several components

   o  The public part of the unique DevID key assigned to that device

   o  An identifying string that's unique to the manufacturer of the
      device.  This is normally the serial number of the unit, which
      might also be printed on a label on the device.

   o  The certificate must be signed by a key traceable to the
      manufacturer's root key.

   With these elements, the device's manufacturer and serial number can
   be identified by analyzing the DevID certificate plus the chain of
   intermediate certs leading back to the manufacturer's root
   certificate.  As is conventional in TLS connections, a nonce must be
   signed by the device in response to a challenge, proving possession
   of its DevID private key.

   RIV uses the DevID to validate a TLS connection to the device as the
   attestation session begins.  Security of this process derives from
   TLS security, with the DevID providing proof that the TLS session
   terminates on the intended device.  [RFC8446].

   Evidence of software integrity is delivered in the form of a quote
   signed by the TPM itself.  Because the contents of the quote are
   signed inside the TPM, any external modification (including
   reformatting to a different data format) will be detected as
   tampering.

   A critical feature of the YANG model described in
   [I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra] is the ability to carry TPM data
   structures in their native format, without requiring any changes to
   the structures as they were signed and delivered by the TPM.  While
   alternate methods of conveying TPM quotes could compress out
   redundant information, or add an additional layer of signing using
   external keys, the important part is to preserve the TPM signing, so
   that tampering anywhere in the path between the TPM itself and the
   Verifier can be detected.

   Prevention of spoofing attacks against attestation systems is also
   important.  There are two cases to consider:

   o  The entire device could be spoofed, that is, when the Verifier
      goes to verify a specific device, it might be redirected to a



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 25]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


      different device.  Use of the 802.1AR identity in the TPM ensures
      that the Verifier's TLS session is in fact terminating on the
      right device.

   o  A compromised device could respond with a spoofed attestation
      result, that is, a compromised OS could return a fabricated quote.

   Protection against spoofed quotes from a device with valid identity
   is a bit more complex.  An identity key must be available to sign any
   kind of nonce or hash offered by the verifier, and consequently,
   could be used to sign a fabricated quote.  To block spoofed
   attestation result, the quote generated inside the TPM must be signed
   by a key that's different from the DevID, called an Attestation Key
   (AK).

   Given separate Attestation and DevID keys, the binding between the AK
   and the same device must also be proven to prevent a man-in-the-
   middle attack (e.g. the 'Asokan Attack' [RFC6813]).

   This is accomplished in RIV through use of an AK certificate with the
   same elements as the DevID (i.e., same manufacturer's serial number,
   signed by the same manufacturer's key), but containing the device's
   unique AK public key instead of the DevID public key.
   [Editor's Note: does this require an OID that says the key is known
   by the CA to be an Attestation key?]

   These two keys and certificates are used together:

   o  The DevID is used to validate a TLS connection terminating on the
      device with a known serial number.

   o  The AK is used to sign attestation quotes, providing proof that
      the attestation evidence comes from the same device.

   Replay attacks, where results of a previous attestation are submitted
   in response to subsequent requests, are usually prevented by
   inclusion of a nonce in the request to the TPM for a quote.  Each
   request from the Verifier includes a new random number (a nonce).
   The resulting quote signed by the TPM contains the same nonce,
   allowing the verifier to determine freshness, i.e., that the
   resulting quote was generated in response to the verifier's specific
   request.  Time-Based Uni-directional Attestation
   [I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda] provides an alternate mechanism to verify
   freshness without requiring a request/response cycle.

   Requiring results of attestation of the operating software to be
   signed by a key known only to the TPM also removes the need to trust
   the device's operating software (beyond the first measurement; see



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 26]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   below); any changes to the quote, generated and signed by the TPM
   itself, made by malicious device software, or in the path back to the
   verifier, will invalidate the signature on the quote.

   Although RIV recommends that device manufacturers pre-provision
   devices with easily-verified DevID and AK certs, use of those
   credentials is not mandatory.  IEEE 802.1AR incorporates the idea of
   an Initial Device ID (IDevID), provisioned by the manufacturer, and a
   Local Device ID (LDevID) provisioned by the owner of the device.  RIV
   extends that concept by defining an Initial Attestation Key (IAK) and
   Local Attestation Key (LAK) with the same properties.

   Device owners can use any method to provision the Local credentials.

   o  TCG document [Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0] shows how the initial
      Attestation keys can be used to certify LDevID and LAK keys.  Use
      of the LDevID and LAK allows the device owner to use a uniform
      identity structure across device types from multiple manufacturers
      (in the same way that an "Asset Tag" is used by many enterprises
      to identify devices they own).  TCG doc [Provisioning-TPM-2.0]
      also contains guidance on provisioning identity keys in TPM 2.0.

   o  But device owners can use any other mechanism they want to assure
      themselves that Local identity certificates are inserted into the
      intended device, including physical inspection and programming in
      a secure location, if they prefer to avoid placing trust in the
      manufacturer-provided keys.

   Clearly, Local keys can't be used for secure Zero Touch provisioning;
   installation of the Local keys can only be done by some process that
   runs before the device is configured for network operation.

   On the other end of the device life cycle, provision should be made
   to wipe Local keys when a device is decommissioned, to indicate that
   the device is no longer owned by the enterprise.  The manufacturer's
   Initial identity keys must be preserved, as they contain no
   information that's not already printed on the device's serial number
   plate.

   In addition to trustworthy provisioning of keys, RIV depends on other
   trust anchors.  (See [GloPlaRoT] for definitions of Roots of Trust.)

   o  Secure identity depends on mechanisms to prevent per-device secret
      keys from being compromised.  The TPM provides this capability as
      a Root of Trust for Storage

   o  Attestation depends on an unbroken chain of measurements, starting
      from the very first measurement.  That first measurement is made



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 27]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


      by code called the Root of Trust for Measurement, typically done
      by trusted firmware stored in boot flash.  Mechanisms for
      maintaining the trustworthiness of the RTM are out of scope for
      RIV, but could include immutable firmware, signed updates, or a
      vendor-specific hardware verification technique.

   o  RIV assumes some level of physical defense for the device.  If a
      TPM that has already been programmed with an authentic DevID is
      stolen and inserted into a counterfeit device, attestation of that
      counterfeit device may become indistinguishable from an authentic
      device.

   RIV also depends on reliable reference measurements, as expressed by
   the RIM [RIM].  The definition of trust procedures for RIMs is out of
   scope for RIV, and the device owner is free to use any policy to
   validate a set of reference measurements.  RIMs may be conveyed out-
   of-band or in-band, as part of the attestation process (see
   Section 3.1.3).  But for embedded devices, where software is usually
   shipped as a self-contained package, RIMs signed by the manufacturer
   and delivered in-band may be more convenient for the device owner.

6.  Conclusion

   TCG technologies can play an important part in the implementation of
   Remote Integrity Verification.  Standards for many of the components
   needed for implementation of RIV already exist:

   o  Platform identity can be based on IEEE 802.1AR Device identity,
      coupled with careful supply-chain management by the manufacturer.

   o  Complex supply chains can be certified using TCG Platform
      Certificates [Platform-Certificates]

   o  The TCG TAP mechanism can be used to retrieve attestation
      evidence.  Work is needed on a YANG model for this protocol.

   o  Reference Measurements must be conveyed from the software
      authority (e.g., the manufacturer) to the system in which
      verification will take place.  IETF CoSWID work forms the basis
      for this, but new work is needed to create an information model
      and YANG implementation.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.






Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 28]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


8.  Appendix

8.1.  Layering Model for Network Equipment Attester and Verifier

   Retrieval of identity and attestation state uses one protocol stack,
   while retrieval of Reference Measurements uses a different set of
   protocols.  Figure 5 shows the components involved.












































Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 29]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   +-----------------------+              +-------------------------+
   |                       |              |                         |
   |       Attester        |<-------------|        Verifier         |
   |       (Device)        |------------->|   (Management Station)  |
   |                       |      |       |                         |
   +-----------------------+      |       +-------------------------+
                                  |
              -------------------- --------------------
              |                                        |
   ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------
   |Reference Integrity Measurements| |         Attestation           |
   ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------

   ********************************************************************
   *         IETF Attestation Reference Interaction Diagram           *
   ********************************************************************

       .......................         .......................
       . Reference Integrity .         .  TAP (PTS2.0) Info  .
       .      Manifest       .         . Model and Canonical .
       .                     .         .     Log Format      .
       .......................         .......................

       *************************  .............. **********************
       * YANG SWID Module      *  . TCG        . * YANG Attestation   *
       * I-D.birkholz-yang-swid*  . Attestation. * Module             *
       *                       *  . MIB        . * I-D.ietf-rats-     *
       *                       *  .            . * yang-tpm-charra    *
       *************************  .............. **********************

       *************************  ************ ************************
       * XML, JSON, CBOR (etc) *  *    UDP   * * XML, JSON, CBOR (etc)*
       *************************  ************ ************************

       *************************               ************************
       *   RESTCONF/NETCONF    *               *   RESTCONF/NETCONF   *
       ************************               *************************

       *************************               ************************
       *       TLS, SSH        *               *       TLS, SSH       *
       *************************               ************************


                       Figure 7: RIV Protocol Stacks

   IETF documents are captured in boxes surrounded by asterisks.  TCG
   documents are shown in boxes surrounded by dots.  The IETF
   Attestation Reference Interaction Diagram, Reference Integrity



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 30]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   Manifest, TAP Information Model and Canonical Log Format, and both
   YANG modules are works in progress.  Information Model layers
   describe abstract data objects that can be requested, and the
   corresponding response SNMP is still widely used, but the industry is
   transitioning to YANG, so in some cases, both will be required.  TLS
   Authentication with TPM has been shown to work; SSH authentication
   using TPM-protected keys is not as easily done [as of 2019]

8.1.1.  Why is OS Attestation Different?

   Even in embedded systems, adding Attestation at the OS level (e.g.
   Linux IMA, Integrity Measurement Architecture [IMA]) increases the
   number of objects to be attested by one or two orders of magnitude,
   involves software that's updated and changed frequently, and
   introduces processes that begin in an unpredictable order.

   TCG and others (including the Linux community) are working on methods
   and procedures for attesting the operating system and application
   software, but standardization is still in process.

8.2.  Implementation Notes

   Table 1 summarizes many of the actions needed to complete an
   Attestation system, with links to relevant documents.  While
   documents are controlled by several standards organizations, the
   implied actions required for implementation are all the
   responsibility of the manufacturer of the device, unless otherwise
   noted.

  +------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |             Component                           |  Controlling   |
  |                                                 | Specification  |
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
  | Make a Secure execution environment             |   TCG RoT      |
  |   o Attestation depends on a secure root of     |   UEFI.org     |
  |     trust for measurement outside the TPM, as   |                |
  |     well as roots for storage and reporting     |                |
  |     inside the TPM.                             |                |
  |   o  Refer to TCG Root of Trust for Measurement.|                |
  |   o  NIST SP 800-193 also provides guidelines   |                |
  |      on Roots of Trust                          |                |
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
  | Provision the TPM as described in               | TCG TPM DevID  |
  |   TCG documents.                                | TCG Platform   |
  |                                                 |   Certificate  |
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
  | Put a DevID or Platform Cert in the TPM         | TCG TPM DevID  |
  |    o Install an Initial Attestation Key at the  | TCG Platform   |



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 31]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


  |      same time so that Attestation can work out |   Certificate  |
  |      of the box                                 |-----------------
  |    o Equipment suppliers and owners may want to | IEEE 802.1AR   |
  |      implement Local Device ID as well as       |                |
  |      Initial Device ID                          |                |
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
  | Connect the TPM to the TLS stack                | Vendor TLS     |
  |    o  Use the DevID in the TPM to authenticate  | stack (This    |
  |       TAP connections, identifying the device   | action is      |
  |                                                 | simply         |
  |                                                 | configuring TLS|
  |                                                 | to use the     |
  |                                                 | DevID as its   |
  |                                                 | trust anchor.) |
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
  | Make CoSWID tags for BIOS/LoaderLKernel objects | IETF CoSWID    |
  |    o  Add reference measurements into SWID tags | ISO/IEC 19770-2|
  |    o  Manufacturer should sign the SWID tags    | NIST IR 8060   |
  |    o  The TCG RIM-IM identifies further         |                |
  |       procedures to create signed RIM           |                |
  |       documents that provide the necessary      |                |
  |       reference information                     |                |
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
  |  Package the SWID tags with a vendor software   | Retrieve tags  |
  |  release                                        | with           |
  |    o  A tag-generator plugin such      | {{I-D.birkholz-yang-swid}}|
  |     as https://github.com/Labs64/swid-maven-plugin               |
  |     can be used                                 |----------------|
  |                                                 | TCG PC Client  |
  |                                                 | RIM            |
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
  |  Use PC Client measurement definitions          | TCG PC Client  |
  |  to define the use of PCRs                      | BIOS           |
  |  (although Windows  OS is rare on Networking    |                |
  |  Equipment, UEFI BIOS is not)                   |                |
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
  |  Use TAP to retrieve measurements               |                |
  |    o  Map TAP to SNMP                           | TCG SNMP MIB   |
  |    o  Map to YANG                               | YANG Module for|
  |  Use Canonical Log Format                       |   Basic        |
  |                                                 |   Attestation  |
  |                                                 | TCG Canonical  |
  |                                                 |   Log Format   |
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
  | Posture Collection Server (as described in IETF |                |
  |  SACMs ECP) should request the                  |                |
  |  attestation and analyze the result             |                |
  | The Management application might be broken down |                |



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 32]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


  |  to several more components:                    |                |
  |    o  A Posture Manager Server                  |                |
  |       which collects reports and stores them in |                |
  |       a database                                |                |
  |    o  One or more Analyzers that can look at the|                |
  |       results and figure out what it means.     |                |
  --------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Figure 8: Component Status

8.3.  Root of Trust for Measurement

   The measurements needed for attestation require that the device being
   attested is equipped with a Root of Trust for Measurement, i.e., some
   trustworthy mechanism that can compute the first measurement in the
   chain of trust required to attest that each stage of system startup
   is verified, a Root of Trust for Storage (i.e., the TPM PCRs) to
   record the results, and a Root of Trust for Reporting to report the
   results [TCGRoT], [GloPlaRoT].

   While there are many complex aspects of a Root of Trust, two aspects
   that are important in the case of attestation are:

   o  The first measurement computed by the Root of Trust for
      Measurement, and stored in the TPM's Root of Trust for Storage, is
      presumed to be correct.

   o  There must not be a way to reset the Root of Trust for Storage
      without re-entering the Root of Trust for Measurement code.

   The first measurement must be computed by code that is implicitly
   trusted; if that first measurement can be subverted, none of the
   remaining measurements can be trusted.  (See [NIST-SP-800-155])

9.  Informative References

   [AIK-Enrollment]
              Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Infrastructure Working
              GroupA CMC Profile for AIK Certificate Enrollment Version
              1.0, Revision 7", March 2011,
              <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
              IWG_CMC_Profile_Cert_Enrollment_v1_r7.pdf>.

   [Canonical-Event-Log]
              Trusted Computing Group, "DRAFT Canonical Event Log Format
              Version: 1.0, Revision: .12", October 2018.





Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 33]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   [EFI-TPM]  Trusted Computing Group, "TCG EFI Platform Specification
              for TPM Family 1.1 or 1.2, Specification Version 1.22,
              Revision 15", January 2014,
              <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/EFI-
              Protocol-Specification-rev13-160330final.pdf>.

   [GloPlaRoT]
              GlobalPlatform Technology, "Root of Trust Definitions and
              Requirements Version 1.1", June 2018,
              <https://globalplatform.org/specs-library/globalplatform-
              root-of-trust-definitions-and-requirements/>.

   [I-D.birkholz-rats-reference-interaction-model]
              Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Newton, C., and L. Chen,
              "Reference Interaction Models for Remote Attestation
              Procedures", draft-birkholz-rats-reference-interaction-
              model-03 (work in progress), July 2020.

   [I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda]
              Fuchs, A., Birkholz, H., McDonald, I., and C. Bormann,
              "Time-Based Uni-Directional Attestation", draft-birkholz-
              rats-tuda-02 (work in progress), March 2020.

   [I-D.birkholz-yang-swid]
              Birkholz, H., "Software Inventory YANG module based on
              Software Identifiers", draft-birkholz-yang-swid-02 (work
              in progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
              Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
              W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture",
              draft-ietf-rats-architecture-05 (work in progress), July
              2020.

   [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
              Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J.
              O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft-
              ietf-rats-eat-03 (work in progress), February 2020.

   [I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra]
              Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Bhandari, S., Sulzen, B., Voit,
              E., Xia, L., Laffey, T., and G. Fedorkow, "A YANG Data
              Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation
              Procedures using TPMs", draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-02
              (work in progress), June 2020.






Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 34]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid]
              Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D.
              Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", draft-
              ietf-sacm-coswid-15 (work in progress), May 2020.

   [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases]
              Richardson, M., Wallace, C., and W. Pan, "Use cases for
              Remote Attestation common encodings", draft-richardson-
              rats-usecases-07 (work in progress), March 2020.

   [I-D.voit-rats-trusted-path-routing]
              Voit, E., "Trusted Path Routing", draft-voit-rats-trusted-
              path-routing-02 (work in progress), June 2020.

   [IEEE-802-1AR]
              Seaman, M., "802.1AR-2018 - IEEE Standard for Local and
              Metropolitan Area Networks - Secure Device Identity, IEEE
              Computer Society", August 2018.

   [IEEE-802.1ae]
              Seaman, M., "802.1AE MAC Security (MACsec)", 2018,
              <https://1.ieee802.org/security/802-1ae/>.

   [IEEE-802.1x]
              IEEE Computer Society, "802.1X-2020 - IEEE Standard for
              Local and Metropolitan Area Networks--Port-Based Network
              Access Control", February 2020,
              <https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1X-2020.html>.

   [IMA]      and , "Integrity Measurement Architecture", June 2019,
              <https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/>.

   [LLDP]     IEEE Computer Society, "802.1AB-2016 - IEEE Standard for
              Local and metropolitan area networks - Station and Media
              Access Control Connectivity Discovery", March 2016,
              <https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1AB-2016.html>.

   [NetEq]    Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Guidance for Securing
              Network Equipment", January 2018,
              <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
              TCG_Guidance_for_Securing_NetEq_1_0r29.pdf>.

   [NIST-IR-8060]
              National Institute for Standards and Technology,
              "Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable Software
              Identification (SWID) Tags", April 2016,
              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2016/
              NIST.IR.8060.pdf>.



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 35]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   [NIST-SP-800-155]
              National Institute for Standards and Technology, "BIOS
              Integrity Measurement Guidelines (Draft)", December 2011,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-
              155/draft/documents/draft-sp800-155_dec2011.pdf>.

   [PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-1.2]
              Trusted Computing Group, "TCG PC Client Specific
              Implementation Specification for Conventional BIOS,
              Specification Version 1.21 Errata, Revision 1.00",
              February 2012, <https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
              content/uploads/TCG_PCClientImplementation_1-21_1_00.pdf>.

   [PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-2.0]
              Trusted Computing Group, "PC Client Specific Platform
              Firmware Profile Specification Family "2.0", Level 00
              Revision 1.04", June 2019,
              <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/pc-client-specific-
              platform-firmware-profile-specification>.

   [PC-Client-RIM]
              Trusted Computing Group, "DRAFT: TCG PC Client Reference
              Integrity Manifest Specification, v.09", December 2019,
              <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/xx>.

   [Platform-Certificates]
              Trusted Computing Group, "DRAFT: TCG Platform Attribute
              Credential Profile, Specification Version 1.0, Revision
              15, 07 December 2017", December 2017.

   [Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0]
              Trusted Computing Group, "DRAFT: TPM Keys for Platform
              DevID for TPM2, Specification Version 0.7, Revision 0",
              October 2018.

   [Platform-ID-TPM-1.2]
              Trusted Computing Group, "TPM Keys for Platform Identity
              for TPM 1.2, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 3",
              August 2015, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
              content/uploads/
              TPM_Keys_for_Platform_Identity_v1_0_r3_Final.pdf>.

   [Provisioning-TPM-2.0]
              Trusted Computing Group, "TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning
              Guidance", March 2015, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
              wp-content/uploads/TCG-TPM-v2.0-Provisioning-Guidance-
              Published-v1r1.pdf>.




Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 36]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC6813]  Salowey, J. and S. Hanna, "The Network Endpoint Assessment
              (NEA) Asokan Attack Analysis", RFC 6813,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6813, December 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6813>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8572]  Watsen, K., Farrer, I., and M. Abrahamsson, "Secure Zero
              Touch Provisioning (SZTP)", RFC 8572,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8572, April 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8572>.

   [RIM]      Trusted Computing Group, "DRAFT: TCG Reference Integrity
              Manifest Information Model", June 2019,
              <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
              TCG_RIM_Model_v1-r13_2feb20.pdf>.

   [SWID]     The International Organization for Standardization/
              International Electrotechnical Commission, "Information
              Technology Software Asset Management Part 2: Software
              Identification Tag, ISO/IEC 19770-2", October 2015,
              <https://www.iso.org/standard/65666.html>.

   [TAP]      Trusted Computing Group, "DRAFT: TCG Trusted Attestation
              Protocol (TAP) Information Model for TPM Families 1.2 and
              2.0 and DICE Family 1.0, Version 1.0, Revision 0.29",
              October 2018.

   [TCGRoT]   Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Roots of Trust
              Specification", October 2018,
              <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
              TCG_Roots_of_Trust_Specification_v0p20_PUBLIC_REVIEW.pdf>.



Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 37]


Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV                  July 2020


Authors' Addresses

   Guy Fedorkow (editor)
   Juniper Networks, Inc.
   US

   Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net


   Eric Voit
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   US

   Email: evoit@cisco.com


   Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay
   National Security Agency
   US

   Email: jmfitz2@nsa.gov






























Fedorkow, et al.        Expires January 13, 2021               [Page 38]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129d, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/