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Adaptive DNS Discovery (ADD)                                     G. Deen
Internet-Draft                                      Comcast-NBCUniversal
Intended status: Informational                             July 13, 2020
Expires: January 14, 2021


                  Adaptive DNS Discovery Threats Here
                       draft-deen-add-threats-00

Abstract

   DNS resolver discovery is designed to operate under a variety
   different levels of trust in the underlying network.  This document
   describes the various trust types that DNS resolver discovery and
   selection may take place under.  Internet Draft.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.




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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  Approach  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.2.  Green or Trusted Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.3.  Yellow or Unknown Networks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.4.  Red or Hostile Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Appendix A.  Additional Stuff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   There are a variety of network environments users may interact with
   where they will be discovering and selecting a DNS resolver each of
   which presents a different threat level to the user.  This document
   attempts to establish a common set of threats classifications for
   reference by Adaptive DNS Discovery (ADD) working group drafts.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Classifications

2.1.  Approach

   There are many ways to classify and structure threat analysis the
   approach used here is centered on the perspective of the user and how
   much subjective trust they can place in different access network
   situations that they may encounter.

2.2.  Green or Trusted Networks

   These are networks in which the user has an high sense of trust.
   These are networks run by a trusted party who is known to the user
   and is trusted by the user to operate the network with security and
   operational integrity.  While even the best run network can be
   compromised by attackers or malware, the user has subjective trust
   that the Green network is very unlikely to be compromised.



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   The user often has a relationship with the network operator - either
   personally, as an employee, or by contract they user has entered into
   such as with an ISP or Mobile Carrier.

   Examples of Green Networks

   o  User's own home network

   o  User's organization, company, or enterprise network

   o  Mobile user's mobile network

   o  User's ISP network

2.3.  Yellow or Unknown Networks

   These are networks in which the user does not have any sense of trust
   and yet has no sense or expectation that the network maybe
   compromised or hostile.  The network's threat level is simply
   unknown.

   These are networks which provided a service to visitors such as
   public Wifi networks.

   Examples of Yellow Networks

   o  School network

   o  Cafe or coffee shop network

   o  Airport network

   o  Hotel network

   o  Conference or event network

2.4.  Red or Hostile Networks

   These are networks in which the user has an high sense of potential
   threats being present, but the use may have no other choice but to
   use them.

   These are networks which the user not only does not trust, but also
   expects the network maybe doing things that the user does not want.

   Red Networks

   o  War zone region network



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   o  Hostile regime network

3.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

   All drafts are required to have an IANA considerations section (see
   Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs
   [RFC5226] for a guide).  If the draft does not require IANA to do
   anything, the section contains an explicit statement that this is the
   case (as above).  If there are no requirements for IANA, the section
   will be removed during conversion into an RFC by the RFC Editor.

4.  Security Considerations

   All drafts are required to have a security considerations section.
   See RFC 3552 [RFC3552] for a guide.

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [Contributors]
              Deen, G., "Authors", 2020.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

5.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

Appendix A.  Additional Stuff

   This becomes an Appendix.






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Author's Address

   Glenn Deen
   Comcast-NBCUniversal
   Universal City, California  91608
   USA

   Email: glenn_deen@comcast.com











































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